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The M'Naghten Rules and
Proposed Alternatives
Responding to overt and implied criticism of the M'Naghten Rules
for determining legal insanity to excuse criminal responsibility, Mr.
Hall proposes a national seminar or study by judges of the diverse
and perplexing problems they must face in deciding issues in this
field. He thinks that M'Naghten needs repair rather than replacement
and that a rough consensus might be attainable.
by Jerome Hall e Distinguished Service Professor of Law, Indiana University
IN THE MARCH, 1963, issue of the
American Bar Association Journal,
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., after
stating that he would not even "by
the slightest intimation suggest" which
insanity test he thought preferable to
the M'Naghten Rules, "if indeed it has
yet been proved that any one of them
is better", proceeds directly to express
some very definite preferences on this
subject. 1
Thus, evidently referring to those
who defend the M'Naghten Rules, he
asks a startling and illuminating ques-
tion: "How valid is the assumption
that morality and safety require pun-
ishment . . . of mentally ill people?"
This is startling because it seems to
suggest that defenders of the M'Naghten
Rules wish to have psychotic persons
punished. It is illuminating because it
indicates a lack of awareness of the
fact that the principal problems in this
area concern the meaning of "mentally
ill", the "knowledge" by reference to
which this is to be determined, and
how mental illness can best be decided
in a democratic society when the issue
is criminal responsibility.2 One's con-
cern is heightened by the justice's con-
fidence in "medical assessment" as a
condition of release from imprisonment
and by his evident opinion that there
is an obvious answer to the question
whether "mentally ill offenders" should
be sent to a hospital or a penal institu-
tion.
The M'Naghten Rules were pro-
pounded by English judges in 1843 in
Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. &
Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, in response
to inquiries from the House of Lords.
They hold that "to establish a defense
on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party ac-
cused was laboring under such a defect
of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong". This test
has been and is followed (with some
glosses) in almost all American juris-
dictions, except New Hampshire, Ver-
mont and perhaps Illinois. In New
Hampshire, for instance, in State v.
Pike, 49 N. H. 399 (1869), the Su-
preme Court of that state formulated a
test holding that an accused is not crim-
inally responsible "if the [unlawful act]
was the offspring or product of mental
disease .. .".
Durham Case Arouses
Interest in Insanity Rules
The present interest in insanity as
a defense in trials of criminal respon-
sibility was aroused by the decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in
1954 in Durham v. United States, 214
F. 2d 862 in which the court held that
a defendant was not criminally respon-
sible "if his unlawful act was the prod-
uct of mental disease or mental defect".
The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has refused, as have many other
courts, to follow the Durham rule, stat
ing: "We are of the opinion that the
following formula most nearly fulfills
the objectives just discussed: The jury
must be satisfied that at the time of
committing the prohibited act the de-
fendant, as a result of mental disease
or defect, lacked substantial capacity
to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law which he is alleged
to have violated." 9
Another alternative to the M'Naghten
Rules is proposed in the Model Penal
1. Brennan, Law and Psychiatry Must Join
in Defending Mentally Ill Criminals, 49 A.B.A.J.
239 (March, 1963).
2. These questions are discussed in HALL,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 449-529
(2d ed. 1960).
3. United States v. Curens, 290 F. 2d 751
(1961).
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Code of the American Law Institute.
This provides:
(1) A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law.
(2) As used in this article, the
terms "mental disease or defect" do
not include an abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct.4
In his article Justice Brennan goes
on to state that "a glance at the tran-
scripts in more than a handful of
cases" convinced him that although an
accused may be "legally sane", he may
"nevertheless [be] seriously disor-
dered". Able psychiatrists, after con-
siderable study of many cases, disagree
on this, and experienced forensic psy-
chiatrists have said that the M'Naghten
Rules operate: well and justly and are
preferable to alternative proposals. 5
The Justice then asks: "Can a true
moral judgment be made about respon-
sibility for any act without delving
deeply enough into the actor's back-
ground ...to attempt to explain the
whole man?" While no mention is
made of anyone who wishes to limit
such an inquiry or of inevitable limita-
tions of any legal or psychiatric in-
quiry, the implication regarding the
present law and its administration is
plain and disturbing.
Justice Brennan also refers to the
"distinguished Drs. Karl Menninger
and Joseph Sotten" and he quotes ap-
provingly and at length from Judge
Bazelon, the author of the Durham
opinion, but he does not mention Drs.
Frederic Wertham and Hervey M.
Cleckley or other distinguished psy-
chiatrists who hold a different opinion
of the current law and of the forensic
use of psychiatry. Finally, there is no
reference to any of the judges of some
twenty jurisdictions, state and federal,
who have rejected the Durham rule
and other proposed alternatives to the
M'Naghten Rules, not even to the par-
ticularly thoughtful opinion of the
chief justice of the Supreme Court of
his own state in State v. Lucas, 30 N. J.
37, 152 A. 2d 50 (1959).
Justice Douglas Thinks
Durham Is Improvement
In a lecture a few years ago to a
group of psychiatrists, Justice William
0. Douglas hailed the Durham rule as a
great improvement on the "rigid", the
"arbitrary, fixed" M'Naghten Rules. 6
He first attributed the M'Naghten test
to political pressure, public clamor and
newspaper publicity, but later he said:
"The only warrant of the M'Naghten
rule of insanity was tradition." "To
most psychiatrists", be continued, the
Durham decision "was a break with
legal tradition that was long overdue."
It has the great advantage of permit-
ting the psychiatrist to "speak to the
court and to the jury in the language
of his discipline", he declared.
Justice Douglas, in my opinion, was
seriously mistaken in every one of
these statements. Not the least signifi-
cant evidence of this is that an over-
whelming majority of the judges who
have had an opportunity to pass on the
question have rejected the Durham rule
and the psychiatry summoned in sup-
port of it. The irony of these implied
and expressed criticisms of the
M'Naghten Rules is that these justices,
cspecially sensitive to the protection of
civil liberties, do not realize that if the
M'Naghten Rules are abandoned, the
consequence will probably be a "tyr-
anny of experts". 7 The vaunted "hu-
manitarianism" of some psychiatrists
contemplates the long-term incarcera-
tion of vast numbers of persons who
have violated no law, as well as the
detention of thousands of petty offend-
ers for as long a time as the so-called
experts withhold their favorable prog-
nosis. It is unfortunate that these jus-
tices do not raise a question regarding
the touted claim that adequate knowl-
edge exists to discharge the above vital
functions fairly and with warranted
assurance in the validity of the "ex-
perts' " decisions.
What is especially significant is the
probability that if judges as able and
conscientious as Justices Brennan and
Douglas lack the knowledge required
to deal soundly with this problem, then
many other judges and lawyers are in
a similar situation. In sum, we face a
complex twentieth century problem
whose solution requires much more
than sympathy with unfortunate per-




Can anything be done to remedy this
situation, especially in its relation to
issues of the gravest importance that
will no doubt be presented in due
course to the Supreme Court? Certainly
it would be a mistake for judges to
refrain from public speaking and
printed publication, for then important
potential contributions would not be
made and the occasional need for fur-
ther study would be unknown.
It may be suggested, in the first
place, that when a judge delivers a
public lecture and has it published in
a widely read journal, it is both fair
and necessary that the views he ex-
presses be subjected to the same sort
of searching criticism as the published
views of others. But objectivity is very
difficult to maintain when a justice of
the United States Supreme Court is
concerned.
Moreover, one can hardly ignore the
fact that although we avow a free
market in ideas as the best test of truth,
the heads of well-financed psychiatric
institutions and powerful officials enjoy
strategic positions in the formation of
public opinion. The implications are
alarming when a justice of the Su-
preme Court appears to have accepted
certain philosophical versions of psy-
chiatry.
It would, of course, be absurd to
imply that either Justice Brennan or
Justice Douglas would approve any
philosophy that depreciated human
freedom. What troubles one is their
apparent failure to recognize the rela-
tionship to human freedom of the thesis
that everyone or that every criminal is
"mentally ill". What troubles, also, is
the apparent acceptance of the ex-
tremely broad meaning of "mental
illness" propagated by psychiatrists
whose philosophy is, quite consistently,
the utter repudiation of freedom, re-
4. Section 4.01, MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed
Official Draft) 66 (1962). See also, Schwartz,
The Model Penal Code: An Invitation to Law
Reform, 49 A.B.A.J. 447, at 449 (May, 1963).
5. HALL, Op. cit. supra at 519-520, passim.
6. Douglas, The Durham Rule: A Meeting
Ground for Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 41 IowA
L. REV. 485 (1956).
7. Werfiam, Psychoauthortariqanis and the
Law, 22 U. CmI. L. REv. 337 (1955).
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Dakota, Louisiana State University
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sponsibility and other basic values of
democratic society. It is hardly possi-
ble to avoid the conclusion that what
is plainly needed is further study of
this difficult problem by judges and
practicing lawyers so that at least the
cogent questions can be raised.
National Seminar
Is Proposed
Can anything be done to facilitate
this and to assure a fair and informed
hearing of these problems? Given com-
petent guidance, it would be possible
for an able lawyer or judge to acquire
a significant degree of critical com-
petence in this area in a year of care-
fully planned reading and bimonthly
discussions. This could be done in sem-
inars or round-table discussions in
which the M'Naghten adherents were
given a role and an opportunity equal
to that of the critics of the prevailing
law. Newspaper reporting and other
interference with dispassionate study
and uninhibited discussion, such as
stenographic or other recording, would
be barred. Efforts should be made to
avoid the connotations of "work"; in-
stead everything should be done to
make the study enjoyable. The corn-
pany of the judges interested in this
particular problem might be augmented
by the admission of thoughtful laymen,
legal philosophers, other scholars and
friends, so that a congenial atmosphere
conducive to discussion prevailed.
The Great Books method of study
depends on a discussion leader who
carries the major burden, and it allows
a larger number to participate than is
possible in a seminar where each par-
ticipant is expected to report in some
detail on a particular problem. On the
other hand, in a discussion group, one
would participate only to the extent be
desired. In a seminar which met bi-
monthly for ten months, twenty par-
ticipants would probably be the maxi-
mum number that could be accommo-
dated.
Ten major phases of a basic prob-
lem, such as that noted above, could
be studied, one each month, with two
participants reporting each session,
preferably on opposed sides. The other
members would prepare for these meet-
ings by reading from a carefully se-
lected bibliography in order to partici-
pate meaningfully in the discussion of
their colleagues' reports. Each partici-
pant would also be preparing his own
report.
A small, able research staff would
be a valuable adjunct to the seminar or
discussion group. It might limit its
function to reporting on specific ques-
tions, e.g., how many psychiatrists are
there in this country, how many of
them have criticized the M'Naghten
Rules, what studies have been made to
determine whether psychiatric testi-
mony is at present restricted.
Some Subjects for Discussion
The following program of a seminar
or discussion group is suggested as
illustrative. No preference is implied
as to the order of studying the various
problems and their formulation is not
wholly neutral since my purpose is,
also, to raise questions regarding cur-
rent criticism of the M'Naghten Rules.
1. What are the principal meanings
of "disease"? Is mental illness like
physical illness, or is it so different
from it that even a very wide analogy
is misleading?
2. What is "science"? Is there an
intermediate type of knowledge between
science, rigorously defined, and com-
mon sense? Where should psychiatry
be placed, e.g., what of statements by
leading psychiatrists to the effect that
psychiatry is an art? What evidence is
there that psychiatrists (a) cure men-
tal illness, (b) diagnose it correctly,
(c) can recognize that persons who
have not committed any harm are so-
cially dangerous and (d) can accu-
rately predict that certain individuals
will commit crimes if they are released
from hospitals or penal institutions?
3. What is an expert, e.g., does that
term imply that there is a body of
knowledge with reference to which all
or most "experts" agree? What is the
basis of the position taken by some
social scientists that psychiatry has not
yet developed to the point where psy-
chiatrists should be permitted to testify
in court as experts? What are the prin-
cipal types or schools of psychiatry,
and what is the significance of diver-
gent theories and divergent diagnoses?
What does this imply regarding the
common assumption that psychiatrists
are expert in classifying certain per-
sons as "psychotic" or "insane"? If
these terms mean extreme and irra-
tional deviation from social norms,
for instance, being a social nuisance,
is such labeling by a psychiatrist more
or less sound than that by an intelligent
jury?
4. Does psychiatry include expert
skill in elucidating such terms as
"right", "freedom", "justice", "punish-
ment" and "responsibility"? What is
the special competence of psychia-
trists? What is the significance of a
deterministic premise when employed
(a) in physical science, (b) in psy-
chiatric research, (c) in therapy, (d)
in deciding whether a person should
be held criminally responsible for a
harm be committed?
5. The history of legal tests of insan-
ity should be explored to ascertain
their relationship to the contemporane-
ous medical and psychiatric knowledge,
moral ideas and views of "human na-
ture" and, also, to evaluate certain re-
cent statements, e.g., that the M'Nagh-
ten Rules were merely the product of
political pressure, that a "wild beast"
test was ever actually a rule of law in
England in the implied literal sense,
and that lawyers have usually impeded
962 American Bar Association Journal
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the march of scientific progress while
doctors have facilitated it.
6. Important, also, is a comparative
study of American, English and Con-
tinental law, especially with reference
to the "irresistible impulse" test as a
complete alternative to the cognitive
(M'Naghten) test. On what grounds
has the Report of the Royal Commis-
sion, 1949-1953, so highly praised in
this country by critics of M'Naghten,
been criticized by English judges, for
instance, Justice Devlin? In the study
of Continental codes, the meaning of
the word "or" needs to be scrutinized
to determine whether its significance
is disjunctive or conjunctive. Conti-
nental cases should be studied to deter-
mine whether the position so vigorously
urged here by very articulate psychia-
trists-that a person's cognitive facul-
ties may be quite normal or even
superior but, nonetheless, he may be
unable to keep from committing the
most serious harms -is actually ac-
cepted in European law. If it is found
to be recognized to some extent, is this
[lie effect of the early nineteenth cen-
tury psychology of separate faculties,
which has been everywhere discarded,
or is it currently supported by able
European psychiatrists?
7. In the study of such social prob-
lems, the most difficult question often
is: What is the question or the proposal
that is nade? This requires logical
analysis of various arguments. For ex-
ample, is it consistent with the psychol-
ogy of integrated personality (that
man functions as a unit) to argue that
M'Naghten should be abandoned? Is it
consistent with that theory of psychol-
ogy to argue that the volitional func-
tion can be seriously disordered but,
at the same time, the cognitive func-
tions remain normal? Is it consistent
to assert that psychiatry does not deal
with human freedom, right and wrong,
responsibility, and justice, and to as-
sert also that the right-and-wrong test
is a vestige of superstition and that
psychotic persons understand the dif-
ference between right and wrong?
Logical inquiry can also disclose the
areas where no assured answer can be
given to certain questions., e.g., whether
punishment deters, whether psychia-
trists can rehabilitate criminals, and so
on. If "experts" in behavioral disci-
plines and psychiatrists do not have
all th desired answers, what is the
role of intelligent laymen in dealing
with such problems, and what of the
legal and ethical standards developed
by thoughtful persons in the course of
many centuries?
8. The characteristics and require-
ments of a democratic legal order
should be studied especially in relation
to tie role of unfettered officials, un-
fettered experts and unfettered juries.
Are the prevailing conceptions of hu-
man nature, individual responsibility,
freedom, right and wrong, as tradi-
tionally expressed in the rules of law
which guide judges and juries, to be
subordinated to the theories of psy-
chiatrists and, if so, to which ones-
Freudian, neo-Freudian, anti-Freudian,
Jungian, Adlerite, existentialist, organi-
cist, neurologist, Reikian, Frommian,
or eclectic? " Should tie selected ex-
perts be permitted to present any theo-
ries or opinions to juries who receive
no guidance from judges or laws?
9. There are still unsettled questions
about "punishment" to be studied;
they involve questions of public policy,
ethics and free discussion. There are
distinctions to be drawn between re-
forms, utopias and the relation of pun-
ishment to freedom and social respon-
sibility. There are issues which concern
hospitalization and punishment, e.g.,
When is a "hospital" a penitentiary?
And again, if we cannot determine
whether punishment deters or whether
experts can rehabilitate offenders, what
is the status of so-called "retributive"
punishment?
10. Finally, efforts might be made
to formulate conclusions reached at the
end of the inquiry, which, presumably,
would correctly and precisely reflect
the various positions held at that time.
Evidently, also, some of the topics and
some of the methods of analysis indi-
cated above would be dealt with or
employed at several meetings.
Study Has Values
Even Without Answers
There is, of course, no certainty that
a general agreement will be reached on
these difficult questions even after a
year's study: it is possible that one's
ultimate premises, one's "can't helps",
as Holmes put it, will persist to the
very end. But this does not imply that
painstaking inquiries are illusory or
mere "ideologies". The more defensi-
ble view is that such study takes one
closer to the relevant truths as well as
to a fuller appreciation of opposed
positions. Certainly the direction and
degree of tolerable compromise could
be more clearly discerned, and in the
practical realm of daily life in a democ-
racy, that may suffice.
For me the existence of a significant
degree of human freedom is a "can't
help", as it is, no doubt, for Justices
Brennan and Douglas and the vast
majority of thoughtful Americans. So,
too, as regards moral values, e.g., that
after thinking about a problem it makes
sense to speak of "right" and "wrong"
actions. But human freedom and
moral values depend upon understand-
ing-they imply the reasoning, gener-
alizing, cognitive functions of the hu-
man mind. "Mental illness" in at least
some of its meanings deeply affects the
validity of these postulates and their
implications.
Seen in relation to these basic postu-
lates, the M'Naghten Rules are neither
a political contrivance nor a mere tra-
dition. They may he faulty in their
formulation, in emphasis on one phase
of personality and in connotating the
one-sidedness of the supporting psy-
chology of the times. But despite its
defects, M'Naghten incorporates the
most important function of human per-
sonality in terms of criteria with which




For that reason, what is relevant is
not the abandonment of M'Naghten,
but only its repair. Just as the Venus
de Milo is not neglected because an
arm is missing, just as the Winged Vic-
tory holds the place of honor in the
world's greatest art museum despite its
8. "We are forced to conclude that the
psychologically minded psychiatrist and his
organicisi colleague, though often members of
the same professional organizations, do not
talk the same language and do not have the
same interests. It is not surprising, then, that
they have nothing good to say to each other,
and that when they do communicate it is only
to castigate each other's work and point of
view." SzAsz, THE MYTH OR MENTAL ILLNESS 93
(1961).
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glaring defect, so, too, reform of the
present law should preserve what is
essential in the M'Naghten Rules. This
means the avoidance of completely
autonomous alternatives such as the
Durham rule, the American Law Insti-
tute's alternative proposal in terms of
lack of "substantial capacity ... to con-
form" and other forms of the "irresist-
ible impulse" hypothesis. A test solely
in terms of "control of conduct" is
ambiguous because it is silent on the
crucial question: whether understand.
ing has anything to do with conduct.
To preserve the sound core of M'Nagh-
ten requires that the rationality of the
human mind (understanding, knowl-
edge, appreciation) be included in the
proposed test, in which case it may, of
course, and probably should be, joined
to other major functions of the per-
sonality.9
There is sufficient acceptance of
these basic premises to warrant the
expectation that a very substantial
agreement can be reached on their ap-
plication to criminal responsibility, in-
cluding the problem of mental illness.
The hazards are the traditions which
envelop and condition our attitudes to-
wards the judiciary and the possibility
that powerful judges will be called on
to render extremely important deci-
sions before they have studied this dif-
ficult subject. American realism, re-
sourcefulness and candor should be
able to meet this challenge.





THE SECTION OF Labor Relations
Law conducted spirited meetings at the
Association's 86th Annual Meeting,
with an extensive three-day program.
Supreme Court Associate Justice
Arthur J. Goldberg, a former member
of the Council of the Section, was a
featured speaker. His remarks will ap-
pear in a later publication of the Sec-
tion.
Reports of the various committees
of the Section were presented and three
received extended attention.
The Committee on National Labor
Relations Board Practices and Proce-
dure, headed by Edward Schneider of
Boston, Massachusetts, and J. Albert
Woll of Washington, D. C., reported
recent revisions in the National Labor
Relations Board Rules and Regulations,
terming the changes a "substantial im-
provement". The Committee reported
that its liaison relations with the board
were improved and cordial, though
there are still some areas of disagree-
ment.
Two committee reports provoked
floor debates. The ad hoc committee
known as "Gulf-Warrior" presented
majority and minority reports on a
resolution to amend Section 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act to overturn the rules
set forth in United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Company, 363 U. S. 574 (1960). After
debate, the minority report, which fa-
vored amendment, was adopted by a
vote of 62 to 49.
Another ad hoc committee-this one
known as "Atkinson-Sinclair" pre-
sented three reports, one representing
a neutral position. The resolution pro-
posed amendment of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act in the light of Sinclair
Refining Company v. Atkinson, 370
U. S. 195 (1962), to permit issuance
of an injunction in violation of a no-
strike provision of a labor contract.
The resolution was amended to provide
that no injunction may be issued ex-
cept on notice and hearing and as
amended was adopted, 63 to 30.
A paper on "Labor Law Decisions
of the Supreme Court, 1962 Term" was
given by Clyde W. Summers of New
Haven, Connecticut. At the annual
luncheon meeting, Arnold Ordman,
newly appointed General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board,
was the principal speaker.
Guests of the Section at the meeting
were Frank W. McCulloch, Chairman
of the N.L.R.B., and John H. Fanning
and Boyd Leedom, members of the
board. Charles Donohue, Solicitor of
Labor of the United States Department
of Labor, participated in the workshop
session on fair labor standards.
The Membership Committee report,
submitted by William F. Joy and Rob-
ert M. Segal of Boston, Massachusetts,
Cochairmen, indicated a substantial
growth in the Section, with a member-
ship now of 2,400.
The meeting concluded with the elec-
tion of new officers and council mem-
bers. Tracy H. Ferguson of Syracuse,
New York, was elected Chairman and
Louis Sherman of Washington, D. C.,
Vice Chairman. Robert F. Koretz, who
is Professor of Law at Syracuse Uni-
versity, is the new Secretary of the
Section. New members of the Council
are Frank A. Constangy of Atlanta,
Georgia, and David Previant of Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin.
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